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IN THE SUPRE}!E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent
v.
CECIL EARL BROOKS and
JAMES CHARLES EDWARD GOOD,

Case No. 16639

Defendant-Appellants

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from

convictions of Aggravated Assault

in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
In a jury trial conducted before the Honorable Peter
·Leary of the Third Judicial District Court, appellants were
ound guilty of two counts of Aggravated Assault, a Third

egree _Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102, 103
nd §76-2-202 (1953 as amended), and sentenced to an indeterminate
erm of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the conviction and judgments
~endered below and a remand of the case to the Third Judicial
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~istrict

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The alleged crime in the instant case took place in
the "hobo jungle".

The participants, four transient hobo-types,

were camped at Roper Yards on the property of Denver and Rio
Grande Railroad (T. 4) .
rails

The fourt had recently joined to ride the

together, and were enroute to Grand Junction, Colorado.

(PH 17, 18)

From there, Donald Storie and Richard Vinson,

(referred to as "Rico" in the record) were headed to Wyoming
and eventually to Montana to work on a ranch.

(PH 7, 17, 66, 90, rn

Cecil Brooks and Jim Good were traveling east and would probably
wind up in Michigan.

(T.334)

On April 23, 1979, Vinson, Brooks, and Good left the
camp at an early hour to go downtown and give plasma for money.
(PH 19, 89) Storie remained in camp alone until late afternoon
when the three returned with food, wine, and tobacco. (PH

19,22)

Storie cooked up a meal over a fire and the group passed around
the jugs of wine.

(PH 21,33,58)

Later on, an argument develope1

concerning money, and the four decided to split up.

(PH 22 ,25)

At preliminary hearing Donald Storie testified that
while the four were traveling together they had agreed to pool
their money.

(PH 9)

But a dispute developed over $14.00 which

Storie said he saw Good stick down his boot.

(PH 24)

that he lost the money, and Storie didn't believe him.

Good said
(PH 24)

As a result of the disagreement, the men decided to split up.
Brooks and Good left the campsite, but returned later in the
evening while Storie was making coffee and Vinson was asleep·

(!
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Storie testified that Brooks came at him with a knife, said

"I didn't steal the $14.00", and then stabbed him in the chest.

(PH 10)

Storie claimed that as he struggled with Brooks, Jim

!!Good hit him with an ax handle.

(PH 11)

He was knocked unconscious

and fell down in a swampy area.

(PH 12)

When he came to, he

observed Brooks and Good standing over Vinson, who was lying
the ground.

Good said, "that son-of-a-bitch down there [referring

l) to Storie] is dead.
kill him."

on

. . i f you' re going to kill him, hurry up and

Brooks responded, "well, I don't want to kill him,

I just want to make him remember."

(PH 12)

Storie blacked out

again, and when he came to, he crawled up to Vins6n ands aw that
he was "bleeding real bad."

(PH 13)

the trainmaster's shack to get help.

He then made his way to
(PH 13)

Richard Vinson also testified at preliminary hearing,
although his memory of the events
10

was somewhat foggy.

He testified

that after the four ate dinner and drank wine, he fell asleep.

He didn't recall any dispute over $14.00 (PH 98)
of Good putting money down his boot.

nor did he know

(PH 105, 118)

Moreover,

he was unaware that the other men had decided to "split".

(PH 100)

Be remembered waking up when it was dark and seeing a man standing

i over him.

(PH 99, 106).

He said he was hit suddenly before he

ould rise up, and then he was unconscious.

(PH 108)

Both men were medically treated for the injuries they
[
Ustained.

p~reast,

(T. 20203, 214)

Storie had a stab wound in his left

lacerations on both thumbs, a fractured left thumb, two
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forearm.

(T. 2-215)

Rico suffered two blunt lacerations on his

forehead, one black eye, a laceration on his left arm, and a
laceration of the neck.

(T.203-204)

At trial the preliminary hearing transcript (the testimony
of Donald Storie and Richard Vinson) formed the basis of the
State's case.

The balance consisted of the testimony of several

police officers, the custodians of the court recordings, and
of the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad.
and James Good took the stand in their defense.

employe~

Both Cecil Brooks
(T.2-297,338)

Brooks' testimony regarding the day's events was for the
most part the same as Storie's.

However, he mentioned that Good

didn't eat any dinner, because he and Storie "had had words about
the food".

(T. 307)

He remembered Storie and Good arguing about

the $14.00 (T.309), and heard Vinson tell Good to get out of camp.
Brooks retorted; "If Jim goes I'm going with him."

(T.309)

When Good attempted to take the tobacco, Storie told him "he wasn't
taking a damn thing."

(T.309)

a knife, and turned toward Good.

Storie then came at Brooks with
(T.310)

Meanwhile, Vinson,

who was several feet from Brooks, came down a small slope toward
him.

Brooks testified that since Vinson had told him that he'd

done fifteen years for killing someone with a knife he (Brooks)
was "scared like hell."

(T.311)

He added that he had no reason

to doubt Vinson because he had scars all over him from knife fights.
Brooks and Vinson scuffled until Good pulled Vinson off and said
"let's get out of here."

The two walked down by the railroad

tracks and encountered Scott Broussard, an investigator for the raiJrr
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They asked him when the next train was leaving, and
he told them to get out of the railroad yards.

(T.2-53)

The two men then walked north toward the viaduct, and later
turned to walk back toward the "flashing lights".
arrested as they were walking black toward camp.

They were
(T.320)

Brooks sustained a cut in the palm of the left hand.
(T. 314)
Good's testimony revealed that on the way downtown
Vinson ran into a man whom he had previously fought with.
man had a scar on his face where Vinson claimed to have
him with a hammer.

(T.342)

The
hit

Back in camp and drunk (T.351),

Good argued with Storie about peeling potatoes too thick and
wasting food.

(T.348)

Storie responded with "If you would

take the $14.00 out of yr.our boot, we would have more food."
Vinson then told Good he could "get the hell out of camp",
and Good responded, "Sui ts me".

(T. 350)

When Good attempted

to take the tobacco, Storie objected and came up with a knife.
Good grabbed an ax handle and took two swings at Storie.
(T.354)

When Storie staggered back and fell in the swamp,

Good turned and hit Vinson with the club to get him off of Brooks.
(T.355)

Brooks and Good walked up the path toward the railroad

yards, and were later arrested as they headed back toward
the flashing lights near camp.

-5-

(T.357)
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DENIED DEFENDANTS THEIR
-RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION BY ALLOWING THE
STATE TO INTRODUCE THE eRUCIAL PART OF
THEIR CASE-IN-CHIEF VIA A PRELIMINARY
HEARING TAPE .
At trial, and over appellant's strenuous objection,
the State was allowed to introduce the taped preliminary
hearing testimony of Donald Storie and Richard Vinson.
The State was therefore able to introduce, not only the
major part, but the critical part, of their substantive
evidence through a tape recording machine.

Appellants

contend that the introduction of this evidence denied them
their constitutional right to confront their accusers in
open trial, as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, Article I,
Section 12.

That section provides:

[I]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be
confronted by the witnesses against him.
The United States Constitution provides the same
protection within the contours of the Sixth Amendment.

In

illuminating the scope of that protection, the United States
Supreme Court, while paying homage to the long valued right
of confrontation, has recognized that it may be dispensed
with under some circumstances.

One of these circumstances

concerns the use of preliminary hearing testimony at a
criminal trial.
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Most recently in the case of Ohio v. Roberts,

U.S.

(40 CCH S.Ct. B3665, June 25, 1980), the Supreme Court expanded
the State's freedom to introduce preliminary hearing testimony
at trial where the witness is unavailable.

There the defendant

was charged with forgery and possession of stolen credit
cards in the name of Bernard Isaacs.

The Isaacs' daughter,

Anita, was questioned by defense counsel at preliminary
hearing concerning her interaction with the defendant.

She

testified that she had permitted him to use her apartment
for several days while she was away, but denied giving him
use of checks and credit cards belonging to her parents.
Counsel did not ask the court to declare Anita a hostile
witness, nor did the prosecutor question her.

At trial,

newly appointed defense counsel objected to the use of the
preliminary hearing transcript on the basis that it violated
the defendant's right to confrontation.

The Court held that

there was no constitutional violation where Anita was unavailable
to testify at trial, and the preliminary hearing transcript bore
sufficient "indicia of reliability" to afford the "trier of
fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of [the]
prior statement," citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970).

Thus, because the prior statement was made under oath,

and defense counsel was not nsignificantly limited in any way
in the scope or nature of his cross-examination," 399 U.S. at
166, the transcript was admissible at the subsequent trial.
Notwithstanding the disposition of the issue in the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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this court can and must afford them greater protection than
the Roberts decision.

It is well recognized that a state is

free to construe its own constitution more narrowly than
the federal constitution, even though the provisions involved
are similar.

See, Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).

The right to confront one's accusers in open trial is a
cherished and vital right.

It envisions

A personal examination and cross-examination of
the witness in which the accused has an
opporttmity, not only of testing the
recollection and sifting the conscience of
the witness, but of compelling him to stand
face to face with the jury in order that they
may look at him, and judge by his demeanor
upon the stand and the manner in which he
gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
belief. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 242-3 (1895).
Utah has recognized, since the early case of State v. Mannion,
57 P.2d 542 (1899), that these rights are essential to a fair
trial.

This Court must therefore take notice of the manner

in which these rights have been sacrificed in the instant
case, and re-examine the policy and spirit behind Utah's
confrontation clause.
Other states have recently tackled the issue, and
have resolved the dileI!IIlla in favor of the defendant.
In People v. Smith, 597 P.2d 204 (1979), the Supreme Court

of Colorado considered the question of whether a transcript
of preliminary hearing testimony should be admissible at a
subsequent trial.

The defendant in Smith was initially

the subject of a civil suit brought by Carmack Motors to
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testified at trial that they were together at Carmack Motors
on a certain date, and Smith made a cash payment for the tractor.
The controversy was resolved against Smith and he was subsequently
charged with perjury, conspiracy to commit perjury, and tampering
with a witness.

Burnite testified at Smith's preliminary

hearing; only this time he recanted his earlier testimony.
Under oath, he admitted that he had agreed to go along with Smith's
story because of Smith's poor luck, inability to make a living,
and concern that a prior felony conviction might undermine
his credibility.

Burnite died prior to trial, and a transcript

of his testimony was admitted into evidence at Smith's trial,
over the latter's objection.

On appeal, the State Supreme

Court held that in view of the limited scope of a
preliminary hearing, the State Constitution precluded the
admission of a preliminary hearing transcript at a subsequent
trial, even though the witness was clearly unavailable.
The Colorado court acknowledged the general admissibility
of recorded testimony taken at a prior judicial proceeding
where the witness has become unavailable and the right of
cross-examination has been exercised.

The court observed

that "transcripts from a previous trial provide no basis for
objection since the defendant presumably has received the full
panoply of procedural and substantive protections."

Id. at 207.

But where the prior judicial proceeding is a preliminary
hearing, the court was convinced that critical differences

comeby into
ALibrary.
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is limited to a determination of probable cause and in effect
functions as a screening device.

Furthermore, evidentiary

and procedural rules are relaxed, and the credibility of
witnesses is generally not explored (cf Utah Code Ann. §77-15-19
(1953 as amended)).

As a result counsel does not have the

same motive to cross-examine at preliminary hearing as he
does at trial.

To illustrate, the court pointed to the

transcript; counsel did not cross-examine regarding the
prejudicial statement that Smith was afraid a prior felony
conviction would undermine his credibility, and counsel did
not explore Burnite' s· credibility even though the issue
was ripe since he was recanting previous testimony.
The above considerations, then, led the Colorado
Court to conclude that a preliminary hearing is too limited
in scope to allow testimony recorded at it to be introduced
at a subsequent trial, regardless of the availability of the
witness.

New Jersey has also modified its rule to reflect an

appreciation for the differences between evidence given at a
preliminary hearing and evidence given at a trial.

In

State v. Moody, 404 A.2d 370 (1978), the court construed its
rule of evidence providing for the admission of testimony
given at a prior hearing where the witness is unavailable to
include only testimony given at a prior trial.

The court noted

that the legislature intended to exclude testimony given at a
preliminary hearing for the reason that cross-examination
in such proceedings is either nonexistent or inadequate.
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Other courts, while not as a matter of law excluding
preliminary hearing testimony, recognize the importance of
exercising caution in admitting such evidence.

In Poe v.

Turner, 353 F. Supp. 672 (1972), the court held that an unavailable
witness' recorded testimony from a prior trial was
admissible in the defendant's second trial.

The court

observed that the defendant was unable to point to any
deficiencies in the confrontation or cross-examination of the
witnesses at the first trial.

The court went on, however, to

distinguish the nature of cross-examination in the context
of a preliminary hearing:
Nor can oetitioner point to any reasons
counsel might have had on that occasion for
exercising restraint in the conduct of the
cross-examination, as petitioner perhaps
could do had the testimony in question been
offered at a preliminary hearing. At a
preliminary hearing, where the standard to
be met by the prosecution is probable
cause, rather than guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, a vigorous defense is less important
and might serve only to harden and preserve
the prosecution's case. Id at 677.
Similar considerations were discussed in People v. Gibbs,
63 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1967).

There the court held that an informer's

transcribed testimony taken at preliminary hearing was
inadmissible at defendant's trial due to inadequate crossexamination.

The court suggested that several qualitative factors

play a role in determining whether cross-examination at a
prior proceeding has been adequate.

Those factors are the

nature of the proceeding, the character of the witness
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
and his connection
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of his direct testimony, and the time and preparatory
opportunities available to the accused and his attorney.
The court elaborated on the significance of the nature of
the proceeding :
[T]he preliminary examination is conducted
as a rather perfunctory uncontested proceeding
with only one likely denouement - an order
holding. the defendant for trial. Only television
lawyers customarily demolish the prosecution
in the magistrate's court. The prosecution
need show only "probable cause," a burden
vastly lighter than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Cormnitting magistrates usually accept the
prosecution evidence at face value, leaving credibility
judgments for the trial of guilt. The tactical
influences pervading the process tend to induce
shallow cross-examination. Limited cross-examination
at the preliminary hearing is a frequent tactic
of adept and skilled defense lawyers. Crossexamination may lack width and depth, not because
counsel lacks opportunity, but because he chooses
to defer his real effort until the trial itself.
The choice creates no defense disadvantage if
the prosecution witness testifies at the trial.
He is then available for painstaking and incisive
cross-examination. If the witness disappears
and his transcribed testimony is read to the
jury, the opportunity for cross-examination
disappears with him. [T]hat situation
exposes
the defense to grave tactical damage.
[Citations and footnotes omitted] Id. at 475
.In the instant case, appellants asserted a number
of arguments in support of their motion to exclude the
preliminary hearing tapes.

Consistent with discussion in the

above - cited cases, defense counsel argued that a
preliminary hearing in Utah is ordinarily a much less searching
exploration into the merits of the case than a trial because
the burden of proof is probable cause as opposed to reasonable
doubt.

(T.M. 57-58)

Counsel contended that trial tactics
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are different at a preliminary hearing, and so may change the
nature of the questions asked and the witnesses called.
Moreover, at the time of preliminary hearing defense
counsel was ignorant of several statements made to police
officers since that information was unavailable under Utah's
discovery rules.

(T.M. 70)

Counsel argued that the lack

of this sort of information severely curtailed their ability
to impeach the witnesses by confronting them with their prior
statements.

Support for the exclusion of the tapes on this

basis alone is found in the case law.

In People v. Garcia,

382 N.E. 2d 316,(1978) the court admitted a witness' preliminary
hearing testimony at trial.

Defendant contended that this

was a denial of his right to confrontation since the preliminary
hearing occurred before he was permitted discovery.

On appeal,

the court held the evidence admissible and observed that a
defendant is not denied adequate cross-examination if further
cross-examination would be of no benefit to him.

Since

the defendant was unable to show that cross-examination of
the witness at the preliminary hearing would have been enhanced
by material made available through discovery, he was denied
relief on appeal.
Appellants contend that in the present case availability
of prior inconsistent statements made by Vinson and Storie
would have enabled them to impeach their credibility and substantially
weaken the State's case.
Additionally, where witnesses are unavailable to testify
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demeanor and evaluate credibility.

An absent witness can't

be confronted with prior inconsistent statements made at the
preliminary hearing, nor can his "sweating brow" or "twitching
cheek" be observed.

(T .M. 70).

If a defendant's right

to confrontation is to have any substance, it must be
accompanied by a convergent right to impeach the confronted
witness.

Prior recorded testimony should be excluded where

that right has not been fully exercised.

In People v. Reed,

414 N.Y. S. 2d 89 (1979), the court did exclude a preliminary
hearing transcript where defense counsel was unaware of the
chronic alcoholism of the witness at the time of preliminary
hearing, and hence, did not go into the credibility of the
witness or his accuracy of recollection.
Similarly, in the instant case, counsel did not explore
the victims' history of alcohol abuse or propensity for
violent behavior.

Defense counsel was unable to use such

information to either buttress the defendants' claim of
self-defense or impair the credibility of the victims'
recollection of the alleged crime.

Appellants submit that

in this case credibility of the State's witnesses was
critical to a conviction.

The victims and defendants had

traveled together for several weeks and were ostensibly
"friends".

A disagreement and split occurred, and two versions

of the evening's events emerged.

The State's failure to

provide any observable witnesses to present the victims'
version precluded the jury from pursuing its task with any
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made when only half the "picture" is viewed.

It was essential

that the jury physically observe the stature and demeanor of
all four participants, hear all possible defenses, and weigh
the evidence accordingly.

For the State's failure to provide

the jury with this opportunity, appellants submit that they
were denied not only their constitutional right to confrontation,
but their right to a fair trial.
Appellants are aware that this court has allowed prior
testimony to be introduced at a subsequent trial under some
circumstances.

(See State v. Oniskor, 410 P.2d 929 (1973));

at trial State may introduce testimony given by witnesses at
preliminary hearing if good faith effort to secure attendance
of witnesses is shown; Gallegos v. Turner, 526 P.2d 1128
(1974); on petition for habeas corpus testimony of rape victim
at first hearing was admissible at second hearing where witness
was shown to be unavailable.)

However, it is interesting to

note that the statutory authority which may have in part
formed the basis for the admissibility of such testimony has
been repealed under the new Code of Criminal Procedure, effective
July 1, 1980.

(See provisions of old code; Utah Code Ann.

§77-44-3, and §77-1-8(4), 1953 as amended)

Only one remaining

provision arguably authorizes the introduction of testimony
recorded at a preliminary hearing, and that is Rule 63(3) of the

Utah Rules of Evidence.

However, appellants submit that

admission of the prior testimony in the instant case does not
comport with the guidelines set forth in subsection (3) of
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did not have "an interest and motive similar" to that which
they had at trial.
The Utah Supreme Court recently discussed the defendant's
right to certain procedural safeguards in the context of a
preliminary hearing in State v. Brackenbury, No. 16372
(~.ay

29, 1980).

The court described the fundamental purpose

of the preliminary hearing as the "ferreting out of groundless
and improvident prosecutions,"

Id. at 7, and went on to state:

Several ancillary purposes supplement
the primary purpose of the hearing.
The examination provides a means of
effectively advising the defendant of
the nature of the accusations against him.
The hearing also provides a discovery device
in which the defendant is not only informed
of nature of the State's case against him,
but is provided a means by which he can discover
and preserve favorable evidence.
The discovery available at the preliminary
hearing represents an important step in the
preparation of the defendant's defense for the
subsequent trial. [footnotes omitted]
Id. at 8.
Thus, the·preliminary hearing is

a~·

albeit an important

one, towards a trial which will afford the defendant the full
panoply of procedural and substantive safeguards.

A defendant's

interest and motive at preliminary hearing is primarily
informational and assists in the preparation of an effective
defense.
At trial, the defendant's interest and motive is
presenting an effective defense, which necessarily includes the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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opportunity to impeach the credibility of the evidence against
him.

Confrontation of a witness enables him to demonstrate

to the jury the witness' demeanor.

This display in the

courtroom should not be underestimated.

As the Supreme Court

of Oregon, in State v. Smyth, 593 P.2d 1166 (1979), recently said:
In our system a defendant is not tried on a
dossier compiled in prior hearings, no matter
how fairly and judiciously conducted. His
guilt must be established at the trial by
evidence that convinces a fact finder beyond
a reasonable doubt. But the earlier opportunity
to question the witness will often avail little
when the jury at the trial sees neither the
witness nor the effect of the cross-examination
recorded in a cold transcript. As the United
States Supreme Court stated-in Barber,
'[t]he right to confrontation is basically a
trial right. It includes both the opportunity
to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury
to weigh the demeanor of the witness.' 390
U.S. at 725, Id. at 82.
Appellants submit that the denial of this crucial
trial right has prevented them from obtaining a fair trial,
and urge this court to revitalize the spirit behind Utah's
constitutional right to confrontation by ruling that the
preliminary hearing tapes should have been excluded.

-17-
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PRELIMINARY

HEARING TAPES IN VIEW OF THE STATE'S FAILURE TO
SATISFY THE TWO REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE.

Most recently in Ohio v. Poberts, __ U.S. _ _ , (40
CCH S.Ct. B 3665, June 25, 1980), the United States Supreme
Court reiterated two crucial requirements which must be
satisfied before a court may admit the preliminary hearing
testimony of an absent witness at a subsequent trial.

The

party offering the testimony must first demonstrate that a good
faith effort has been made to procure the attendance of the
witness at trial.

Secondly, the hearsay is admissible only

if it bears sufficient indicia of reliability so as to assure
its trustworthiness.

Neither requirement has been satisfied

in the instant case, and admission of the preliminary hearing
tapes was therefore error.

THE STATE FAILED TO MAKE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO
OBTAIN THE WITNESSES AT TRIAL.
In Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968), the
United States Supreme Court declared that "[a] witness is not

'unavailable' for purposes of [an] exception to the confrontatior
requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made
a good faith effort to obtain his presence at trial."

Utah

has recognized the constitutional standard set out in Barber
and has held that the State's failure to exercise due diligence
in securing the attendance of witnesses at trial does indeed
operate as a denial of the defendant's rights.

See
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exercised reasonable diligence must be determined from the
facts and circumstances of each particular case.
The facts of the instant case militate against a finding
that the State exercised due diligence in procuring the attendance
of Donald Storie and Richard Vinson at trial.

James Foster,

a detective for the Salt Lake Police Department, testified
that, following the preliminary hearing on May 16th, he returned
Vinson and Storie to Saint Mary's Home (an alcoholic rehabilitation
center).

Six days later, on May 22nd, he received a phone

call from Vinson informing him that Storie had left town on
May 18.

(T.H.M. 8)

Foster notified the prosecutor of this

development on May 25, and she directed that they "wait and
see" if Storie returned.

(T.H.M. 9)

Subsequently, on

June 19th, Foster was contacted by Jessie Barker (victim
witness~department.-r-County

Attorney's Office) who indicated that

had left an address of next of kin in Bakersfield with his
physician, Dr. Berman.

(T.H.M. 9)

Through contacting the

Bakersfield Police Department, Foster was able to locate a
phone number for Everett Tracy, Storie's half-brother.

When

contacted, Tracy said he hadn't seen his "brother", but told
Foster that Storie had visited a brother-in-law in Fresno
during the latter part of May.

(T.H.M. 12)

Foster also checked

with the Greyline and Trailways Bus Co. and welfare assistance
on June 19th, but was unable to uncover any leads.
17)

(T.H.M. 11,

No -further effort was made until July 6, just 3 days

before the date set for trial.

At that time Foster contacted
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Joe Cavenetti, Storie's brother-in-law in Fresno,

Cavenetti

had not seen Storie but suggested that Foster call Storie's
twin brother in Phoenix.
and also with the Rescue

(T .H.M. 14)
~.issions

A check with the brother,

in Fresno and Sacramento,

revealed no information as to Storie's whereabouts.

Foster

and Sgt. Fontaine also checked the post office, Saint Mary's
Home, the Salt Lake Rescue Mission, and Pioneer Park, to no
avail.

(T.H.M. 13, 17, 18)

It is undisputed that Detective

Foster never received a subpoena for Donald Storie.

(T.H.M.

17)
During this period of time Foster had contact with
Richard Vinson on two occasions.

Vinson, as indicated above,

called Foster on May 22nd to inform him of Storie' s disappearance
In addition Vinson contacted Foster on May 25th to tell him
that he had moved to the Tower Hotel, a halfway house.

When

Foster received a subpoena for Vinson, a call to the manager
of the hotel revealed that Vinson had moved out approximately
a week and one-half earlier.

(T. H.M. 17)

On June 18th special

agent Scott Broussard informed Foster that he had seen Vinson
down at the railroad yards, but merely advised him to get off
railroad proper"ty.
was

(T.H.M. 16)

Neither Vinson nor Storie

ever located by Detective Foster.

Subsequent to the day

set for trial, on July lOtl( the subpoena ordered Vinson to appear
on the 9th) Detective Foster finally contacted the Cross Ranch
in Montana, but to no avail.

(T.290)
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When viewed in light of relevant case law, these facts
plainly do not rise to the level of due diligence required of
the State.

In Fresneda v. State

483 P.2d 1011 (Alas. 1971),

on facts markedly similar to those in the present case, the
court found the State's efforts to be lacking in due diligence.
There the District Attorney's secretary made a few limited
efforts to locate the missing witness earlier in the month
before the trial, but no systematic search.was begun before
December 22, with trial scheduled for December 29.

At that

time police records were checked, and several hours of telephone
conversations revealed a strong possibility that the witness
had joined the army.

At trial the witness' enlistment

was verified, but his actual location was never determined.
Significantly, no subpoena for the witness was ever issued.
The court found the efforts to locate and return the witness
did not rise to a level of due diligence, and therefore
the prior testimony of the witness was inadmissible.
A factor noted by the court in Fresneda, and identified
by another court as an "important element to be weighed", is

the lapse of time between the State's awareness of the necessity
of procuring a missing witness for trial and the start of the
search to locate him.

People v. Horn, 36 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1964)

In the instant case, the State was notified that Storie had
disappeared on May 22nd, yet no e;ffort •.,as made to locate him
until a month later, and then only in response to a lead
~ffered

by a third party.

Moreover, another one-half month
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passed before the State attempted to follow up on the
information disclosed by Tracy on June 19th.

Cavenetti

was not contacted until July 6th, nor were other·>possible
leads pursued until that date.

Since the trial date was known

on May 25th, it is obvious that the inquiries made on July
6th were little more than last-ditch efforts to find witnesses
for a trial fast approaching.
While appellants don't begrudge the prosecutor and
detective their rights to a summer vacation, they do question
the limited vitality with which the State pursued its
obligation to afford them fundamental protections,
T.H.M. 29, 51)

(See

Serious efforts to locate the witnesses

collDilenced only after the prosecutor returned from her vacation.
Investigation was further thwarted

by the fact that Detective

Foster had been on vacation for a week and in Denver for a
week.

(T.H.M. 28)

He also admitted that due to a heavy

case load and his assignment to more important cases,
appellants' case had been relegated to a lower priority.
(T.H.M. 29)

While independently these collateral

concerns

may be understandable, and even excusable, their cummulative
effect in the instant case was to preclude a systematic and
thorough effort to locate the missing witnesses.
It is also essential that a prosecutor pursue all
specific leads, as well as other reasonable alternatives, in hi 5
search for a witness.

In People v. Starr, 280 N.W. 2d 519 (19n

1

three attempts to serve a missing witness with a subpoena were
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unsuccessful.

During the last attempt, on Jtme 29th,

officers learned that the witness was out-of-state on vacation
and his whereabouts was

tmknown.

On July 5, the day

before trial, the prosecutor contacted the witness' mother and
was told that she didn't know when he was coming back.

The

preliminary hearing testimony of the witness was admitted
at trial over appellant's objection.

On appeal, the court held that the State failed to
make a diligent effort to find the witness.

The court noted

that other steps were feasible and should have been tmdertaken.
The State could have· contacted five individuals who were present
on the night of the incident, including the witness' girlfriend,
or checked out a rtnnor concerning the witness' whereabouts,
or talked to officers where defendant was incarcerated who
were well-acquainted with the movement of people in the area
in which the principals lived.

The fact that the inquiries

may not have been fruitful was immaterial to the court.
prosecutor

The

still had a duty to pursue not only specific

leads, but also those endeavors reasonably likely to produce
them.:
Where there are no leads as to a witness' whereabouts,
the prosecutor should inquire of known persons who
might reasonably be expected to have information that
would help locate the witness. Where there are
specific leads as to a witness' location, the
prosecutoriii'USt check them out. Id. at 521.
(Emphasis added)
(See also People v. Mcintosh, 204 N.W. 2d 135, (Mich 1973); no
due diligence where "most specific lead was not checked out
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In addition, the prosecutor has a duty to supervise
and coordinate the effort to locate the missing witness.
In State v. Greer, 552 P.2d 1212 (1976), an investigator was
requested to locate a witness for trial on January 20th.
When the defendant failed to appear for trial a bench warrant
was issued, and trial was reset for July 1.

On June 23,

the investigator received another request to locate the
witness.

He checked the Motor Vehicle Department, Driver's

License Bureau, talked to the witness' sister-in-law who
referred him to the witness' mother who was unaware of his
whereabouts, and atten:pted to serve a subpoena on
the witness at an address obtained through the Motor Vehicle
Department.
The court held that the trial court erred in its finding
that the State made sufficient effort to place the witness
under subpoena.

Where the investigator failed to check the

witness' previous place of employment, or to question the
witness' mother or sister-in-law in sufficient depth or
to check an address listed in the police report, such failure was
fatal to the State's claim of "due diligence".

The court

emphasized the responsibility of the prosecutor to supervise
and coordinate the investigation.

Since the prosecutor neither

instructed the investigator to make further efforts nor
suggested additional leads, he was unable to show that due
diligence had been exercised.
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The investigation engaged in by the State must
consist of something other than the mere dialing of telephone
numbers.

In People v. Rogers, 398 N.E. 2d 1058 (1979) the court

held that effort consisting of eight to ten telephone calls
to contact the witness did not amount to a good faith
effort by the state,

The court observed that

[T)he mere failure to successfully contact a
missing witness by telaphone falls far short of
a demonstration of due diligence in attempting
to locate the witness. Clearly, some effort
other than telephone communication should
have been employed to secure [the witness']
presence. Id. at 1060.
In the present casP., efforts to locate Storie and
Vinson consisted primarily of telephone calls made on
June 19th and July 6th.

Other reasonable efforts could have and

should have been employed to locate the witnesses.
instance, at no

For

time did Detective Foster visit Roper

Yards in order to obtain leads on the hobos' whereabouts.
It is likely that he could have seen them in the "jungle"
or at least conversed with other hobos who might have been
able to aid in the search.
Vinson at the yards

Indeed, Agent Broussard did see

on the 18th.

Nor did Detective Foster

attempt to contact the "Cross Ranch" in Montana prior to
trial or the authorities. in Oroville.

Both Storie and Vinson

mentioned going to the Cross .Ranch numerous times at the
preliminary hearing.

(PH 7, 17, 66, 72, 90, 115)

The hobos

also talked about going up to a ranch in Montana to work when
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despite these specific references to their intended destination
no attempt whatsoever was made by the State to follow up on
the lead.
The prosecutor failed to supervise and coordinate the
effort to locate the witnesses.

She was aware of the

numerous references to the "Cross Ranch" and yet failed to
instruct Detective Foster to pursue the lead.

She also failed

to inform Foster of the trial date which was known to her on
the 25th of May, so that Foster could have relayed the information
to Vinson when he called from the Tower Motel.

Moreover,

Foster never received a subpoena from the prosecutor for Donald
Storie.

Clearly, the State was remiss in its duty to adequately

supervise and coordinate the search for Storie and Vinson.
Due diligence also requires that the State take steps
to insure the appearance of a witness when there is reason
to know that he might not appear for trial.
People, 593 P.2d 316 (1978), the preliminary

In Flores v.
hearing

testimony of a priest was admitted at trial, where on the
trial date the priest was in the hospital in critical condition
as a result of complications due to leukemia.

On appeal,

defendant argued that the testimony was inadmissible because
the State failed to exercise due diligence in procuring
Father Dudley's presence at trial.

The Colorado Supreme Court

agreed and found that the State's efforts fell below the
standard required.

The court observed that the district

attorney not only knew of the priest's potentially terminal
illness four months before trial, but also knew of his whereabouti
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The court felt that in light of those facts, the State had
an obligation to preserve Father Dudley's testimony by
way of deposition.

In conclusion, the court stressed that

Where a party seeking to introduce testimony
from prior judicial proceedings has notice of
facts which probably would render a witness
unavailable on the day of trial, that party has
a duty to pursue means of preserving the
witness' testimony. Id at 319.
In the instant case, no effort was made to either
preserve the testimony of the witnesses or assure their attendance
at trial.

Both the prosecutor and Detective Foster were

aware of the transient habits of hobos riding the rails.
They had reason to know that Vinson and Storie had no
intention of remaining in Salt Lake for any extended time,
especially since neither had sought employment.

Yet, it

would have been possible to take any of several steps
to insure their presence at trial.
in Flores
deposition.

As the court suggested

their testimony could have been

preserved via a

Or a subpoena could have been issued at the

preliminary hearing to advise of an approximate trial.date,
pending verification.

Additionally, no attempt was made to

utilize the provisions in Utah Code Ann. §77-15-25 and
§77-15-26 (1953 as amended).

Those sectiops provide that a

witness may be required to post a bond or surety if the
magistrate is satisfied that there is reason to believe that
the witness will not appear at trial.
The mere fact that these witnesses were transients
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at trial.

While transients naturally are more difficult to

locate, the standard of due diligence is not modified accordingly,
The State's burden nevertheless remains high.

In People v.

Enriguez, 561 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1977), a transient's preliminary
hearing testimony which was critical to the prosecution's
case was admitted at trial.

The California Supreme Court

found this to be error and listed the steps the people could
have taken to locate Prieto, the transient 17 year old.

The

State could have checked the high school Prieto testified
that he expected to attend.

Prieto had also indicated that

he might be picking fruit "up north"i yet the prosecution
failed to try and reach him through employer organizations,
farm labor unions, or other employee organizations.

In

addition the court observed that no effort was made to ascertain
the names of Prieto' s friends or acquaintances who might have been
able to provide information.

The court rejected the argument

that such efforts would be unsuccessful and disapproved
of the prosecutor's remark that "

[t]trying to serve

a warrant on an itinerant fruit picker is like looking for
a needle in a haystack."

Id. at 271.

599 P.2d 1225 (Or. App. 1979),

[cf State v. Anderson,

where the court found that

due diligence had been exercised in locating a transient
"hippie-type" individual; subpoena taken to last known address
on two occasions, local post office contacted and other
addresses checked, sheriff's deputies spoke with other persons
living in the cabin and surrounding areas, follow-up contacts
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California.

The search began

in early May, 1978, as soon

as a trial date was set for August 29, 1978, and continued
to the day of trial.]
A comparison of the State's efforts in the instant
case to those employed in the above-cited cases compels the
conclusion that these

witn~sses

were not "unavailable" for

purposes of admitting their prior testimony.

It is obvious

that something less than a "good faith" effort was
utilized to track them down.
were ignored.

Substantial, positive leads

The brunt of the investigation was postponed

until the last minute, and even then it consisted of little
more than a half-hearted, perfunctory attempt.

This court

should not allow the prosecution to so casually dispense
with appellants' vital constitutional rights.
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TAPE DID NOT BEAR

SUFFICIENT !Nb!c!A OF RELWIL!TY TO PERMIT
ITS ADMISSION AT TRIAL.

The United States Supreme Court, in Ohio v, Roberts,
su:ii:-a observed that there are sufficient "guarantees of trustworthiness in the accoutrements
itself. .
witness'
citing

"

of the preliminary hearing

so as to permit the admission of an unavailable

preliminary hearing testimony at trial,
Galifornia v. Green 399 U.S. 149 (1970). Appellants

submit that a blanket application of this principle to the
facts of.the instant case would be manifestly unfair.

Rather,

a more cautious evaluation of the reliability of Storie and
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While a closer scrutiny is not constitutionally mandated, this
court can nonetheless afford appellants greater protection of
important constitutional guarantees.
Counsel for appellants requested the trial court to
grant them a hearing on the reliability of the tapes prior to
their admission at trial.

(T.H.M. 83)

As support for the

court's ability to grant them such a hearing they cited the
case of California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, at 186 n. 20, wherein
Justice Harlan, concurring, stated:
It will, of course, be the unusual situation where
the prosecution's entire case is built upon
hearsay testimony of an unavailable witness. In
such circumstances the defendant would be entitled
to a hearin on the reliabilit of the testimon
citations Ollll.tte
The Circuit Court in United States v. Kearney, 420 F.2d 170
(D.C. Cir. 1969), also approved such a procedure.
trial court

There the

held a hearing out of the jury's presence

to determine whether certain hearsay testimony was reliable
enough to be admitted.
Appellants submit that a hearing in the instant case
would have demonstrated the patent unreliability of the
preliminary hearing testimony of both Donald Storie and
Richard Vinson.

Of noteworthy significance is the fact that

the hearsay testimony of these two hobos, who were
ostensibly friends of the two defendants, formed the crux
of the prosecution's case.
be scrutinized closely.

Their testimony, therefore, must

Storie and Vinson had every reason

to lie at preliminary hearing.

They knew they would not appear
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nonexistent.

Moreover, it was advantageous for both men

to testify for the State at preliminary hearing since the
State picked up the medical bills and made every effort to
keep its prosecution witnesses comfortable.

(T.H.M. 71)

The testimony itself is replete with internal
inconsistencies and incredible statements.

Storie testified

that Good put the $14.00 down his boot, and they later argued
about Good losing it.

(PH 24)

Yet Storie goes on to testify

that Brooks came at him with a knife, saying "I didn't steal

.(PH 10)

the $14. 00"

There was testimony by Storie that

the ax handle which was used to hit Good was taken from a box
car.

(PH 11)

Yet the firewood the hobos were burning was

comprised solely of ax handles,

(PH 33)

Storie testified that

after the "fracas" Vinson was laying motionless on his front
(face down), and Vinson testified that he was laying on his
back.

(PH 41, 108)

Vinson also testified that, despite his

inability to recall the events of the scuffle, he was certain
that it occurred around 8:00 p.m. since he could tell time by
the stars.

(PH 113)

These examples of some of the statements

made by the two hobos illustrate the unreliability of the
testimony that, in and of itself, convicted the appellants.
Perhaps the jury would have been more sensitive to the
incredibility of the testimony had they seen the seedy characters
who offered it.

In any event, where the hobos were missing

at trial, and the evidence was critical to the State's case,

it was
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admissibility of such unreliable testimony.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING
TO GIVE APPELLANTS ' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
NO. 23

Defense counsel excepted to the refusal of the trial
court to give Instruction No. 23 (T.2-388), which stated
that:
The absence of a testifying witness who could
provide the jury with material evidence is one
factor you may consider when weighing their
credibility. The jury should view with caution
such testimony if you find that the witness
could have made themselves available for
trial.
You should always bear in mind that the law
never imposes on a defendant in a criminal case
the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or
producing any evidence.
Comi.sel maintained that the jury was entitled to a cautionary
instruction on the use of extensive hearsay evidence at trial.
As support for the contention, counsel referred the court to
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 186 (1970), note 20,
Justice Harlan, concurring, which said that:
Due process also requires that the defense be
given ample opportunity to alert the jury to
the pitfalls of accepting hearsay at face
value, and the defendant would, of course,
u on re uest be entitled to cautiona
instructions.
c . § • , Manua on ury
Instructions, 33 FRD 501 (missing witnesses).
(Emphasis added)
-32-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellants submit that such an instruction is not
only appropriate, but necessary, under the unique circumstances
of this case.

The prosecution's case was built principally on

hearsay, and the jury Wis in a poor position to appreciate the
implications of that fact.

They were likely to accept the

hearsay at face value, and disregard inconsistencies in testimony
that would otherwise impeach a witness on the stand before
them.

Moreover, their judgment was hampered by being

deprived of additional material evidence (for instance, evidence
relating to appellants' claims of self-defense) because the
witnesses chose to absent themselves from the process of the
Court.
The effect of all of this in the courtroom is obvious.
The jury observes two motley-looking characters sitting at
defense tabile, and ultimately views their somewhat "seedy"
demeanor on the witness stand.

Meanwhile, via tape recordings,

they only hear innocent cries of the alleged victims.

Were

the victims available to testify, their "seedy demeanor" would
match that of the defendants, and the jury would be forced to
fully evaluate the credibility of ali four.
become more difficult;

The decision would

Internal inconsistencies in testimony

would assume greater relevancy as they bore on the witnesses'
credibility.

And appel:hant:Js' claims.,of 'Self-defense 'would· be

scrutinized in thee context of the 'ltot:Jal picture".

Thus, 'When

both- the loss of critical demeanor evidence and the unearthing
of additional material evidence hampers an

effective defense,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-33-

at the very least the defendant is entitled to an instruction
cautioning the jury in their evaluation of the hearsay.
POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 'FHE VERDICT
Appellants contend that the evidence was insufficient
as a matter of law to support the verdicts in Count I,
Aggravated Assault upon Richard Donald Vinson, and Count II,
Aggravated Assault upon Donald L. Storie.
The standard in Utah for review of the sufficiency
of the evidence for a confiction is that "it must appear that
upon so viewing the evidence

reasonable minds must necessarily

entertain a reasonable doubt that the defendant conmitted
crime."

State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1977).

An

application of this standard to the facts of the instant case
mandates a reversal of the convictions on both counts.
The testimony of Donald Storie and Richard Vinson was
replete with internal inconsistencies and contradictions.
Richard Vinson specifically remembered that James Good hit him
on the right temple with a stick or pick handle, and yet had
been "sleeping" innnediately before the blow was struck.
Curiously, Storie provoked the argument regarding the lost
money in Good's boot, yet lacked any knowledge whatsoever of
how the men's possessions were split up.

The witnesses

testified inconsistently as to who was drunk, and to what
extent.

Other examples of the unreliability of the

testimony appear under Point II.

In short, the testimony of
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However, it is equally arguable that the.testimony
of Brooks and Good was lacking in credibility as well.

Thus,

the jury was left with a choice between two far-fetched accounts
of an evening's events.

They could believe that Brooks and Good

defended themselves when Storie and Vinson attempted to kick
them out of camp and keep the tobacco, or they could accept
Storie's and Vinson's version that Brooks and Good later
returned to the campsite to assault them.
Where either story is plausible, a verdict of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt is impossible.

In all probability

this was simply an altercation between four hobos who ganged
up

on each other and argued over the dividing of possessions.

Reasonable minds could not therefore believe Brooks and Good
were guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
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CONCLUSION
The State has failed to sustain its burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.

A finding of guilt on these facts amounts

to nothing more than a conviction on the basis of probable cause.
Considerations of due process prevent convictions based on
insufficient proof and an unreliable evidentiary basis.

Appellants

are therefore entitled a reversal of the verdicts rendered against
them.
Respectfully submitted this

/~f/day

of September,

1980.
On behlilf of defendant-appellant CECIL EARL BROOKS,

I can see no other issues
in this brief.

On behalf of defendant-appellant JAMES CHARLES EDWARD GOOD,

I can see no other issues that should be raised that are not
included in this brief.
Appellant Gooa I
I,

I
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